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1970-1971 Harvard - M.I.T. Joint Seminar on Political Development

DISCUSSION SUMMARY

First Session

October 7, 1970

M.I.T. Faculty Club

Those members present at the session were Bowie, Brower, Burki, Cocks, Hartz, Hirschman, Hutchines, Jervis, Kautsky, Krasner, Montgomery, Moran, Nye, Perlmutter, Popkin, Powell, Schwarz, Berger, Blackmer, Choucri, Feldman, Field, Frey, Griffith, Huey, Jackson, Kecskemeti, Lerner, Mazlish, Nelson, Rogers, Rotberg, Singh, Haviland, Meagher, Von Lazar, Castagno, Ojha, Rothman, Kurth, speaker, Huntington, chairman, Dominguez, recorder.

Mr. Kurth presented the paper which had been mailed in advance to the members of the seminar. In addition, he made the following points:

KURTH: There may be two different patterns of relations between equal powers. The European, emphasizing the balance of power or the multipolar perspective, and the American, emphasizing the bipolar perspective. The European pattern stresses the ad hoc nature of allies and enemies, and attenuates the difference between the two. The American pattern would stress one country (Russia, then China, now Russia again) or one ideology (once fascism, now communism) as a monolithic and momentous enemy. If the view of the two different patterns of equal relations (e.g. multipolar and bipolar) were accepted and added to the view of two different patterns of unequal relations (colonial and hegemonic) we might see a connection between the pairs. Multipolar perspectives would encourage pre-emptive colonization or what was called in the 1880s the scramble for Africa. Each of the several great powers would feel compelled to establish a definite presence in a small or weak country or territory before another great power did so. And with many players in the game the laws of probability would suggest that any player would break any rule short of full and exclusive colonization. Bipolar perspectives, in contrast, would be more hospitable to tacit or explicit agreements on a division of labor, or spheres of influence, or as the Chinese put it, joint Soviet-American collaboration to divide the world. Here, full and formal colonization for the control of the small countries is not necessary. Hegemony may be quite sufficient. Relatedly, it can also be argued that multipolar systems are system dominant, that is, the system is the main determinant. Thus statesmen and scholars have argued for the primacy of foreign policy or the national interest defined in terms of power. And in contrast, it can be argued that bipolar systems are more unit dominant. Examples are Woodrow Wilson's primacy of domestic politics or Charles Beard's idea of the national interest, based on economic

considerations. The primacy of domestic interests is especially pronounced not in relations with other great powers, but in relations with small countries.

KURTH: Given an array of alternative explanations (such as the six that were mentioned in the paper: cultural, political, economic, strategic, bureaucratic, and psychological) one confronts two very serious problems in choosing among them. One problem is that of alternative causes of the problem of a posteriori over-determination. I would argue that for nearly every event of interest in the analysis of foreign policy one can distinguish or invent a posteriori several alternative explanations, and sometimes even all six alternative explanations which have been mentioned. Each of these is logically and plausible a sufficient explanation for the event. It is both an exclusive and an exhaustive explanation for it. I would argue especially that nearly every event can be explained or rationalized in terms of the international system. Further, not only can foreign policy events be internationalized, but most of them can be psychologized, bureaucratized, economized, politicized and culturized. This is not all. The bureaucratic and the economic theories are variations on the theme of rational policy making -- a strategy of conflict where the locus of rationality shifted from the level of the unitary rational actor in the international system to the level of the unitary bureau in the bureaucratic system or the unitary corporation in the economic system. Theories of rational interest can be attacked at these lower levels, just as theories of the rational national interest can be attacked at the highest levels. Thus the bureaucratic and economic theories can themselves be psychologized and culturized, and even bureaucratized and economized and so on down through the bureaucratic and corporate hierarchies ad infinitum. A posteriori, the foreign policy event is over-determined by several alternative and analytically co-equal explanations; the logical dynamic of the process of discovery or inventing alternative causes is to equalize explanations and to destroy degrees of validity among explanations while not destroying the explanations themselves. We are thus left entangled within a thicket of theories. This condition of a posteriori over-determination with several alternative and analytically co-equal explanations characterizes each of the most important American hegemonic policies of the 1960s, such as the Vietnam war, the Dominican intervention, the abortive Bay of Pigs intervention, and the policies toward NATO (including the abortive MLF).

The second problem is more familiar. It is the problem of alternative consequences, or the problem of a priori under-determination. This problem, which is related to the problem of explanation and prediction, rather than explanation alone, is the reverse of the first problem. No one major explanation or causal theory, or combination of them, is sufficient for confident a priori prediction of foreign policy events. One cause can yield several different alternative and even opposite consequences. This is largely true even if we might attempt retroactive prediction, that

is, pick an historical event, take several alternative explanations and try to imagine ourselves in the attempt to predict the event before it actually occurred. In brief, a priori, the foreign policy event is under-determined by an explanation or a group of explanations which yield several alternative and analytically co-equal consequences.

Now, at first glance, the obvious answer to selection from this array of explanations is simply to look at the evidence. However, evidence itself contains certain biases toward certain theories. We have, nevertheless, two main standards of excellence in selecting theories. One standard of excellence would be evidence, that would be the empirical method; the other standard of excellence would be elegance, that would be the logical method.

The evidential method is more attuned to conservative explanations, the elegance method is more attuned to radical ones.

A third solution, beyond evidence and logic, would be the skeptical solution: to rest satisfied without choosing among explanations, and to hope that the combination of interlocking and reinforcing explanations is the best explanation of all. This is a very reasonable solution. It is supported by such concepts as accessory condition, probabilistic cause, and ceteris paribus arguments. Yet I would argue that this solution is flawed. It is intellectually unsatisfying and even self-abnegating. For example, if one accepts a combination of all of the theories, one has the problem that another may come up with a seventh theory -- the devil theory. It would then be argued that the reason United States foreign policy is what it is can be traced to the presence of the devil amidst the policy makers. Clearly the skeptical solution should not be expected to incorporate that. Yet, if one has a principle that distinguishes between theories six and seven, why should there not be a principle to distinguish among the first six theories? I will leave aside the other problems of this solution.

The fourth answer is the metaphysical or existential solution, that is, faith. But why do men make their leap of faith in one direction rather than another? Many men seem to choose their foreign policy explanations on the basis of faith. We now seem to be entering a period of multiple and competing explanations of United States foreign policy, each based on faith, and each immune to being disproved by evidence or by logic. Under this condition the process of argument and the fuel of passion will probably lead to reinforcing and rigidifying the alternative theories rather than dissolving them into a great empirical and pragmatic consensus. And the epistemological contract will be broken, and the intellectual union based on common standards of excellence will be dissolved. In its place will be constructed great and grand alternative world views, and each shall expand and link with other theories related to other political and social phenomena. Around these shall cluster men who are at one intellectual and faithful, and together they may recapitulate the great conflicting ideological arguments of an earlier Europe. Perhaps the dissolution of the epistemological contract may lead to the dissolution of the social contract.

KURTH: One of the more interesting non-American hegemonic systems is Germany and Southeast Europe. It was a hegemonic system marked by unusual dependence of the client states on the great market of the modern great power. The years of the Great Depression were an example of the most refined use of markets as a hegemonic instrument. This is a time when all European states needed stable and predictable access to foreign markets. But it was also a time before the international economy had been routinized by the adoption of norms and practices which came after the Second World War concerning non-discrimination in trade relations as codified in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Thus the 1930s was an era marked by extraordinary demand for foreign markets and extraordinary freedom and power in awarding them. It was the era of British imperial preference. It was the era of hegemonic preference too. By the late 1930s, political analysts -- especially German ones -- glimpsed a version of a new world order based upon several great hegemonic systems, woven together by trade and other close economic relationships.

Even before the Great Depression, Germany had taken a large proportion of the trade of Southeast Europe but the percentage declined sharply in the early years of the Depression. With the advent of the Nazi regime and the onset of German economic recovery, Germany regained and surpassed quickly its share of the trade of Southeast Europe. It did so initially under the direction, not of a Nazi, but of a traditional conservative; only later did direction pass to the Nazis. By 1935, Germany in Southeast Europe was in a position of market dominance similar to the position of the United States in Latin America at the same time and ever since. By 1937 the policy makers of the several states had become fearful of excessive dependence on the German market and temporarily reduced their exports to Germany. However, by then it was already difficult or impossible to restore independence. For example, landlords and peasant cooperatives which had obtained contracts involving trade with Germany pressured their governments to maintain friendly and stable relations. Further, Germany's acquisition of Austria and western Czechoslovakia sharply increased the size of its market while reducing the alternatives open to Southeast Europe. Thus as early as the mid-1930s and certainly by 1939, Germany had established a splendid hegemonic system built upon the instrument of the great market. It was potentially quite stable and durable, and only needed repose to be routinized. Indeed the system was undone not by resisting client states but by Germany itself. Hitler displaced the German conservative and moderate vision of a hegemonic system with his own atavistic colonial vision of living space in the east, a vision of German soldier-peasants settled in the new German marchland which would replace the Soviet Union.

During the Second World War the trade experiences of the 1930s were summarized, systematized and related to power and international relations by Albert Hirschman in his book on national power and the structure of foreign

trade. Although I will not review the arguments and theories of that book, I think that they are relevant to an understanding of relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, France and Subsahara Africa, and to possible current trends in United States trade policies.

KURTH: Some schematic suggestions of the effect of hegemony on modernity, or more specifically, of hegemony on the social, political and economic modernization of small countries can be made. Here we might distinguish two patterns, the American and the Soviet. The United States in Latin America and East Asia helps modernize the society and the economy; it does not modernize the polity. The United States, instead, pluralizes the polity and, in extreme cases, praetorianizes it by giving aid to the police, to the military, to the peasants, to this, to that, as it does in Latin America (where the worst case may be the Dominican Republic). Therefore, the United States aborts political modernization. In contrast, the Soviet Union in East Europe helps modernize the society, the economy, but also the polity, or more specifically the party. Now a strong Communist party can become a Frankenstein monster, as it did in Czechoslovakia. Where the United States pluralizes the polity, and in extreme cases praetorianizes it, the Soviet Union pressurizes it, (puts its garrisons in it, puts limits upon it), and in extreme cases polarizes it, (dividing the nation into pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet ranks). The United States aborts political modernization, the Soviet Union stunts it. This suggests that one of the best ways to full and free political modernization may be the combination of a Communist party and a country far away from the Soviet Union, such as Cuba, either Vietnam, the Dominican Republic in 1965 or a future Chile, that is, countries most attacked or most aborted by the modern United States.

DISCUSSION

ROTHMAN: I have been puzzled by the definition of hegemony from the very beginning. There are difficulties in comparing the Soviet Union and Latin America, even though there may be some striking similarities. For example, United States interests and influence in Latin America -- at least up to the end of the nineteenth century -- were primarily limited to the Caribbean and Mexico, and did not extend to the bulk of South America. This traditional relation can hardly be compared to the activities of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe.

KURTH: I agree with much of what you say. As I already indicated, the case of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe is not merely hegemonic: it is a pathological case because it relies on the presence of permanent garrisons in modern states. Therefore, I am already accepting the proposition that the presence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe is much more pressuring and constricting than the presence of the United States in Latin America, and even in the Caribbean. On the second point, I did draw a distinction in the case of the United States in Latin America between pre-1898 and post-1898. So this too would be in agreement with the distinction you draw.

ROTHMAN: But then take Argentina. I would argue that, until World War II and even after, United States influence upon Argentine politics was relatively minimal.

KUTH: Yes, I think you are right.

ROTHMAN: What do you mean then, by hegemonic? Hegemony implies dominance. We trade and do business with Argentina. But the British had a lot of capital in the United States in the nineteenth century. Were they hegemonic over us? Hegemony implies control.

KURTH: I think control or dominance are elastic words, and there are degrees to them. I did not use these terms. I will concede the need to be empirical, or what might be called operational. We should be able to use words that we can agree upon and whose empirical referents we know. Control and dominance are not those kinds of words. Therefore, I used the four characteristics which are etched out in my paper. The one which comes closest to control or dominance is the expectation of intervention. Now, Argentina is a superb case which may cast doubt on my definition. I would have to agree that one could not call United States-Argentine relations in the 1930s hegemonic, for the British were a far more important country for Argentina at that time than the United States. I would further agree that United States hegemony is much stronger in Central America than it is in South America. But I would argue, especially since World War II, the formation of the OAS, the shift in trade patterns which occurred during the war, and the rise of such advisory or proxy interventions as the activities of Special Forces in Bolivia and police advisors in Uruguay, that there is sufficient expectation of intervention in South America to classify it as a hegemonic system, even though the intensity of the hegemony is admittedly more intense in Middle America. But I will also concede that it would be a much richer case if the precise distinctions between Middle and South America were pointed out more precisely. And then it would be further necessary to describe a continuum with Eastern Europe and South America at the edges, and Middle America in between.

NYE: I am bothered by your search for a single equation, or a single causal model. When one looks at your refutation of the strategic and economic theories, as you do, in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, the presence of a single negative case appears to be sufficient to disprove them. Then when you switch to your own theory, you use probabilistic terminology. In terms of your own standards of excellence, you should apply the same strict tests to your own theories in order to determine whether the exceptions which you allow to yourself are as damaging to your theories as other exceptions may be to strategic and economic theories. Basically this relates to your search for a single equation model. Why are you not looking for a multi-causal model? We certainly have standards of evidence to distinguish among theories, even to distinguish the devil theory from the others. It is not true that all the theories that could be envisaged are equal.

KURTH: Your basic point is important. The modernity argument has to fit into an overall strategic argument. The way I am working it out in my own research is that the strategic argument provides the over-all framework, even though it is under-determining for it does not explain enough. The strategic argument is necessary. My point was that I am dissatisfied with existing formulations of the argument. What I am trying to do is to resculpture the economic argument within it -- though I think that modernization and modernity are better concepts -- put these two together, along with elements of the bureaucratic arguments, and then attempt an examination of politics with a threefold set of explanations. I think that your essential point is valid. I certainly do not want to throw out the strategic argument. But I would still stress that the present versions of the strategic argument are under-determining. Although the modernity argument is also under-determining, it is less so.

FREY: There are a number of features in the model which you presented which I find unclear. One is this notion of hegemony. If one looks at the four characteristics, one cannot find control.

KURTH: That was deliberate.

FREY: The word "hegemony" seems to me to include or have overtures of the concept of "control". If you take this concept out of it, then hegemony becomes less interesting to me. Then much would depend on your further elaboration of your concepts of modernity and modernization. Let us look at your four points from the standpoint of control. Your first point stresses one big power and several smaller ones, where the ratio of resources is at least two to one. There is no necessary influence to which you point in that asymmetry. Your second point is the expectation of intervention. Your definition does not require that such interventions would actually happen, merely that they are expected in case of an attempt by a small power to defect from the hegemonic system. Third, there are formal treaties which define relations between the big and small states. Whether actual relations live up to the formal treaties, or whether the relations are significant or trivial, is not clear. Four, economic relations are more intensive between the small and the large states, than among the former themselves. Then, given that control is at least unclear in your characteristics, we must go back to your concepts of modernity and modernization. Your use of these concepts of modernity is essentially economically defined where the main element of modernity is economic development.

KURTH: No, it is not "essentially economically defined." That is one condition, but it is not a sufficient one.

FREY: Let us then look at your points. The first one deals with resources. Though I am not sure what you mean by it exactly, it has a large economic element. Number four is explicitly economic. You seem to be saying that you find more intensive economic relations between more economically de-

veloped and less economically developed countries than among peers, which does not surprise me.

KURTH: But that would not be true, because there is more trade among developed countries.

FREY: At any rate, beyond the general descriptive characteristics of your first and fourth points, then the most critical one for your argument is the one on general expectations of intervention. Moreover, you get a great deal of leverage from the overtones of influence, control and power in the word hegemony.

KURTH: First, I have tried to select words which are empirical and operational, that we can at least point to things. The hegemony argument I think is fairly clear; the weakest element is "general expectations" but I still think that it is better than control or dominance. As for modernity, I did not spell out the empirical referents in the essay -- as I did for hegemony -- because this is what we have been talking about in this seminar for years. My main goal is to find terms, such as Hegemony and modernity, which have empirical referents. I can point them to a cluster of data and attach a label. You can attach other labels.

FREY: But your labels point in a different direction from what gives the concept of hegemony its original interest, namely influence. You say you do not stress influence.

KURTH: Let me say why I have not used words like influence or power. When I began my research I considered these terms, including Robert Dahl's efforts to make the concepts empirical. I think those efforts were unsuccessful. Moreover, at the present time I have no way to make power or influence empirical so that a group of people can agree on the meaning of these terms. These are very debatable terms. I am thus willing to use much less interesting criteria which are empirical.

BROWER: I am amused by the idea that if we cannot get a general agreement on an empirical definition of power, that this, then, is something that should not concern us. Power is a significant reality of modern life, from which we should not run away simply because we cannot find satisfactory quantitative indicators. I think that the first criterion of the concept of hegemony, as used in the essay, points to a critical issue for all of us, namely the great deal of power inequality in the world. I want to look at the main issue of your paper: why does a major power follow a policy of hegemony, rather than one of annexation or colonization or non-intervention? It is interesting to note that these are the only four alternatives which you suggest are available to a great power in international politics. At least three of the four have pejorative connotations. From humanistic or democratic perspectives, you offer us only nonintervention. But, from this point on, one

looks in vain in your paper for an explanation of the reasons why a great power may follow a policy of nonintervention.

KURTH: I think that my diagram on available policies is concerned with these issues. Moreover, the section which I did not discuss here suggests a neocolonial model, in which there is economic presence without intervention.

BROWER: I must admit that, starting from a value orientation, I did not find much sub-classification of the available alternatives on the positive side of the spectrum. There is not much discussion of the types of interaction which could be called mutual, or cooperative or benign. I do not blame you for this, for I think that this is an accurate reflection of the modern world. But the paper could benefit from a discussion of the reasons why this is an improbable expectation in the existing world power structure. This takes me back to the need to stress issues of power in your analysis. It also seems to me that you shortchange the economic argument by throwing it out simply because of the behavior of the Soviet Union. The economic argument could be useful in looking at factors which are internal to these societies, including considerable inequality within the United States.

KURTH: I quite agree that for a study of this type it is essential to look at the structure of the polity and at the structure of the economy. Moreover, as I argued in the case of the strategic argument, I am primarily dissatisfied with the existing formulations of the economic arguments, not with their potential if they are recast.

GRIFFITH: I would argue that the Soviet Union is not encouraging economic modernization in Eastern Europe. It is discouraging it in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. As for the argument that the United States is a hegemonic power, I think that our speaker has fallen in the trap of "American exceptionalism." The Soviets are more hegemonic in Eastern Europe, and the French in West Africa, than the United States in Latin America. I would suggest that the case is simply that all great powers, not simply the United States, have these hegemonic tendencies.

KURTH: I would agree that it is the case, but this is not sufficient, because it does not explain why they are hegemonic in some cases or colonial in another.

GRIFFITH: There are, moreover, variations in time and instruments. Taking the example of the multinational corporation, one must examine the extent to which Europeans may prefer to have the corporations present because they gain from them in economic growth, as opposed to being against them because they lose in national autonomy. It all depends on which of these two values one prefers.

KURTH: I think I had suggested that there are some strains produced by the multinational corporation, but I also indicated that it can provide for a very stable system. A large modern power can have a stable relation with small

modern powers, through the multinational corporation, precisely because economic benefits are preferred.

GRIFFITH: I want to stress again that I think that you are an "American exceptionalist" because you think that the United States is peculiar in being hegemonic while the French in Africa are a much better example and, secondly, because you are utopian in that you think that it could stop being hegemonic. I think it is extremely unlikely that this could happen.

KURTH: We do not disagree on the second point. I also think that it is extremely unlikely. As for American exceptionalism, all I said is that the United States has a special, not a unique propensity toward hegemony.

HIRSCHMAN: There is an important element of a hegemonic system, as I understand it, which has been left out of the definition. There is a discrepancy between the formal, legal and ideological structure of the relations in a hegemonic system and the actual relations in the system. There is a disparity between pretense and reality which appears most clearly in emergency situations for the system. It is a crucial fifth characteristic of hegemonic systems. This may also introduce a dynamic quality in your theory. As a result of this disparity, there is instability in the system between its ideological and its actual manifestations. One can live with a disparity between reality and ideology for some time, but not without tension. Demands and unease are created. There is a second problem of determining whether a particular system continues to be hegemonic. For example, if the United States does not intervene to stop Allende's election in Chile, does this mean that the United States has ceased to be hegemonic? The problem of tests for the continuation of a hegemonic system during periods between great crises in the system is one which needs further elaboration.

KURTH: I think you have made a very lucid point about the gap between reality and ideology in a hegemonic system. I have often wondered whether the study of hegemony is but a study of hypocrisy. The Germans of the 1930s were more frank about this. Because the formal independence of the members and inequality are both necessary conditions of a hegemonic system, there is a built-in element of hypocrisy.

LERNER: There are two comments which may be in order. The first is that I would urge you to supplement your present theoretical scheme with further extensive historical investigation. Secondly, you might want to consider once again the efforts of Harold Lasswell and others to give an empirical dimension to power, and indeed to measure it. There have been a great many theoretical and empirical efforts in this regard which may contribute to your own research.

KURTH: I fully agree with the need for thorough historical investigation. Each of the ten hegemonic systems that I have discussed has at least four or five grand books and a number of lesser works. I have based the thoughts which I have presented in this paper upon my reflections on the historical literature.

As for the contributions of the Lasswell tradition of social scientists, I have not found it very helpful. I see more tautology than theory.

LERNER: You are encountering difficulties with your theories because you seem to be in a perilous search for a chimerical universal history. You should beware of mistaking similarities and parallelisms for common causes and consequences which are linked to each other. When one pursues a project which seeks to explain as much as you do, the need for great caution is essential.

KURTH: Let me concede that any attempt to condense almost three hundred years and ten systems into fifteen pages is almost sacriligeous. The constraints of time tonight have prevented me from presenting more evidence. Quite clearly, my research requires that pages of exposition be devoted to discussing the historical differences as well as the over-all similarities. Therefore, I do not disagree with the essence of your comment. It simply appeared to me to be more useful, in forty-five minutes, to stress similarities rather than a broad array of differences among these systems.

SCHWARZ: I appreciate your search for a single dominant cause. But for what purpose do you seek to find this single cause? I do not think that I am being inelegant if I find a different cause for a given act in one time or in another. Secondly, and here I disagree with Daniel Lerner, I think you could do more universal history. I am not convinced that what you are studying is only a function of modern society, and that you can talk about them with relation to the ancient world in the West or in China -- even if there are some modern modalities.

KURTH: In a footnote, I pointed out that there may be something deceptive in the trichotomy of traditional, modernizing and modern. You can take many of the criteria which we ordinarily use to define a modern society and discover that ancient Athens and, to some extent, ancient Rome had almost all of those criteria. There may be ancientization as well as modernization. Thus I would argue that the Delian League is a hegemonic system. There are also some periods of the Roman Republic when one finds hegemonic relations. Machiavelli describes three ways of domination, and argues that the Romans had the best because they included such things as internal autonomy and tight alliances. So I quite agree with your second point. I was simply focusing on systems since the Peace of Westphalia, which roughly corresponds to the modern era, but I would argue also that one does not find hegemonic systems from the fall of Rome to the modern era, except some features of the Chinese dynasties and of Byzantine rule. As for the single cause, as I said before, I am in fact looking for a combination of explanations which stress strategic and modernization theories. The stress is not on one cause, but on a collection of them.

Let me illustrate with the United States and the Soviet Union, and let us allow for simplification for the sake of time. One can say that the

imperative toward hegemony in the Soviet Union or in a communist system is the political system and the economic system not nearly as much (I am aware of the need for much more qualification). This is Adam Ulam's argument that the Soviet Union must import its legitimacy from its foreign relations. In the United States, on the other hand, the economic system pushes toward hegemony, but the political system much less so. We can disagree on these particular propositions. But I think they illustrate that I am aware that mere generality is an insufficient test of the excellence of a theory. One may find that something is always present, but this does not mean that it is always salient. Something may be present but minor in one system, present but major in another.

POWELL: It struck me that, in many theoretical writings about modernization, Latin America is usually the exception or the counter-example which the theory does not explain adequately. You have turned this around and have taken the United States/Latin America relationship as the norm, and are being criticized from the perspective of other parts of the world. I want to comment especially on your second point of the definition of hegemony: that there is a general expectation of intervention. You were criticized by some who said that this did not happen in Argentina, because there was no empirical evidence of United States intervention in Argentina. But as a Latin Americanist, I find your concept of "expectation of intervention" on the part of Latin American elites rather persuasive, whether or not there is actual evidence of intervention. I think, however, there is a real problem for all of us to present evidence that there are such expectations -- but I do not think that the essence of the argument is weakened by this difficulty. The problem of evidence, then, is the most serious here.

KURTH: Especially because I was the one who stressed that I wanted a definition which was as empirical as possible. I admit this is the weakest point.

POWELL: Friedrich and Key, among others, have called this the theory of anticipated reaction. But there is no empirical evidence for it either. We do not know whether politicians really have such reactions. Where and how can one get evidence for these things? But, as a Latin Americanist, I am convinced that for elites -- even in Argentina and Brazil -- the United States is the primary reference group and the fear of intervention has been established in the Caribbean and elsewhere in the world for them. I think you have a substantive point, but must struggle with the problem of evidence.

KURTH: I quite agree that evidence for the expectation of intervention is the fundamental weakness of my definition. Joe Nye had an elegant retort to this. He wondered if one could "think oneself" out of a hegemonic system, by stopping to expect the intervention. The Italian states, in the Austrian hegemonic system, thought themselves out of hegemony for six months or a year. But they discovered, when the Austrians intervened again, that they were still trapped. This is what I meant by "sporadic." The ex-

-pection was not routinized. For the United States, I have asserted that the expectation is more routinized, and you agree with it. But it is very difficult to supply the evidence.

POPKIN: Some seem to have been upset here that political development in all sorts of little countries is affected by the actions of big countries. I am especially interested in the tools of hegemony, the kinds of things that big countries do in hegemonic systems. I am interested now in political development, not in why there is hegemony or colonialism. I am interested in why a country develops differently because it is part of one hegemonic system rather than another; or within a hegemonic system, which countries develop in which ways. How adaptable the tools of hegemony are, whatever they are? What are the differences in the tools of the early hegemonies and the late hegemonies? And for the United States, what options and tools does it have available in different countries? What can the United States do that really affects the political development of a small country?

KURTH: Given the constraints of time, I chose to focus in this paper on the causes or imperatives for hegemony. There was very little discussion of the consequences or instruments of hegemony. But what you are asking is very important. One way to answer you is to have a footnote to Sam Huntington, who argued that massive U.S. foreign policy, especially in its military aspects, ir over. He argued further that one has to move beyond it in order to build up political parties. This is already a shift in emphasis and instrument. There was a prototype of this in the earlier shift from the Hoover to the Roosevelt administrations. In Vietnam as in Nicaragua, one has had military intervention against a guerrilla war. The reaction was similar in kind, though different in degree. Huntington moves away from intervention through building up the U.S. military to intervention through building up local political parties. In the earlier case, there was a shift from intervention through the U.S. military to intervention through building up the local constabulary. This was the shift to the Good Neighbor policy which no longer required direct intervention. One could imagine a post-Vietnam analog where the United States could try to build up a party, even though this may appear unlikely. Therefore, there are changes, though the reasons for the changes vary. In the present Vietnam case, I would argue that, as the United States moves from a modern to a post-modern society, military values recede and military intervention becomes more difficult and costly. Huntington has discussed "covert and discreet" intervention which may be more appropriate to a post-modern society. In the case of Nicaragua, the general argument did not work, and one would have to look for particular reasons. Now I only answered one part.

POPKIN: But an important start: the United States determines who gets the guns in the country.

KECSKEMETI: I think the concept of hegemony is a valuable one, but there are some difficulties. The essential distinction between hegemony and empire is very good, especially the point that in a hegemonic system the small states have formal independence, while this is not the case in an imperial system. But this brings havoc to some of the ten cases.

British India was an imperial system, not a hegemonic one. The Indian states did not have their sovereignty recognized in international law, nor were there diplomatic representatives accredited to them. Therefore, if you want to categorize the existing systems in the world, surely the Soviet system in Eastern Europe is very different from the British Raj in India. The same holds for the Austrian system in Italy. It is wrong to start this at the end of the Napoleonic wars. Actually, Austrian imperial domination in Italy goes back to the end of the War of Spanish Succession, and it was more imperial than hegemonic.

KURTH: That is precisely the reason why I did not include it. It was hegemonic, in Italy's case, from 1815 to 1859.

KECSKEMETI: It was not hegemonic then because Austrian princes ruled throughout Italy in an imperial fashion.

KURTH: That is wrong. Lombardy was imperial. But Tuscany, the Papal States, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and other states were in a hegemonic system. There is, in fact, an analogy between the British in India and the Austrians in Italy. The Austrians were imperial in northern Italy while to the South shore was a hegemonic system. The British were imperial in parts of India and hegemonic in the princely states.

KECSKEMETI: Venetia was imperial, Tuscany was under an Austrian dynasty.

KURTH: Tuscany was a formally independent state.

KECSKEMETI: Tuscany would be a more hegemonic case, but Austria in Italy was mainly imperial.

KURTH: The only imperial sections are Lombardy and Venetia.

KECSKEMETI: I want to turn to a terminological problem in the use of the traditional concept of hegemony, which is a situation where there is one predominant or hegemonic power surrounded by others in a balance of power system. We encounter a problem of time. Using the traditional concept of hegemony, we find that Spain was a hegemonic power in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was succeeded by the French by the end of the seventeenth century, who lasted to the War of the Spanish Succession, and then were followed by the British hegemony.

KURTH: I would deny that. The classical European distinction was between preponderancy or primacy and hegemony. In the balance of power, when there was a prime power, a first among equals, the classical term in the European historical literature was preponderancy or primacy. Bismarck, from 1870 to 1890, was a preponderant force in Europe. Hegemony, in the historic sense, is different from preponderancy, and is much closer to my use of the term. It entails a far greater degree of inequality among the powers. I would deny that the classical European use of the term hegemony is what you say it is: the first among equals in a balance of power situation.

KECSKEMETI: Let us avoid arguments about words. The point is that, in the historical setting, the essence of the French problem in Europe was not what you call hegemony in the Rhineland.

KURTH: Of course. The essence of the French problem in Europe was primacy. In the Rhineland, however, it was hegemony in several states: in the ecclesiastical electorate of Cologne and others.

KECSKEMETI: My general point is that you need to distinguish a variety of situations, with different concentrations of power in the leading state at the time, with different patterns of coalitions, and varying uses for garrisons. One needs to distinguish a variety of possible satellite situations, where intervention by the leading power may or may not be required.

KURTH: I would agree with you on many of these last points. Our main disagreement is on the schematic distinction between primacy and hegemony. I would agree that a full exposition should study both, and show that hegemony in many ways is inferior or subordinate to primacy in the overall general system.

JACOBY(Moscow State University): I want to explore further the dimensions of hegemony. One could begin with Julius Caesar's expeditions which established the first regular system which depended on outside interventions and which brought about significant changes in culture in the territories which were the object of the interventions. Later in history other cases can be found, such as the Crimean Tartars under the Ottoman empire, or Russian kingdoms under Mongolian and Tartar domination. So we can easily find other examples of hegemonic systems.

KURTH: I would argue that most of those that you mentioned would have a suzerainty aspect. There had to be formal genuflection of the subordinate to the superior, formal deference which registered the inferiority. But in hegemony there is formal equality, but actual inequality.

JACOBY: There is another point. Hegemonic systems may not last long because interventions cannot keep them going on indefinitely. Moreover, in the Soviet Union, we read that sometimes the relations between Soviet citizens in central Asia and the Russian part of the Soviet Union may be considered hegemonic. Yet sometimes it appears that the dominated part is the main beneficiary of this relationship. There are many examples of relationships which, under your scheme, could be called hegemonic even though the allegedly subordinate part receives most of the benefits.

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